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Abstract
This paper challenges the conventional belief that entrepreneurship is an unsta-
ble career path. Using longitudinal matched employer–employee data from Den-
mark, a transition to entrepreneurship is shown to decrease individuals turnover
tendencies. Three explanations are identified and empirically explored:(i) job
matching, (ii) labor market value, and (iii) personal commitment. The findings
showed that the entrepreneurs appeared to be more productive and thus better
matched compared to wageworkers. However, the entrepreneurs also appeared
to be locked in because of their reduced value in the labor market. Finally, en-
trepreneurs whose spouse was working in the start-up and startups with negative
net capital were associated negatively with turnover, suggesting that personal
commitments contribute to delaying the exit from entrepreneurship. Finally, the
counter-intuitive finding – entrepreneurship yields greater employment stability
– only hold with respect to subsequent transition to wagework and not to new
venture founding, thus providing additional support for the proposed mechanisms.
The results have implications for our understanding of entrepreneurial entry and
labor market dynamics.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, employment turnover, job matching, labor market
value, personal commitment
*The paper authors are listed alphabetically representing their equal contribution to the final paper.
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Executive summary
Although there is an active and growing literature on the returns to entrepreneurship
(Hamilton, 2000; Hyytinen et al., 2013), little is known about the effect of entrepreneur-
ship on individual’s job stability. This is surprising given that job stability may be
the result of workers being better matched to a specific firm, and in turn being more
productive in that organizational setting (Jovanovic, 1982; Jackson, 2013). Moreover,
entrepreneurs tend to have a history as job hoppers (e.g. Astebro and Thompson, 2011).
Hence, it becomes interesting to understand the sources of this job hopping tendency
and whether entrepreneurship changes this behavior.
Accordingly, this paper addresses the question of whether entrepreneurship is
associated with a downward shift in the individual’s turnover rate. Longitudinal
data covering the population of individuals active in the Danish labor market are
used to estimate differences in turnover rates between entrepreneurs and comparable
wageworkers identified by means of a propensity score matching technique. While
entrepreneurship is often portrayed as an unstable career associated with high failure
rates, we find that, conditional on moving, entrepreneurship yields greater job stability.
The paper offers empirical evidence around three mechanisms potentially contributing
to this downward shift of individual’s employment turnover rate: (i) job matching;
(ii) labor market value; and (iii) personal commitment. First, entrepreneurs appear
to be better matched in their employment status where job matching is modelled as
average residuals in an income regression with firm and individual fixed effects. Yet,
we also find evidence of lock-in effects. Lower turnover among entrepreneurs is partly
attributed to an expected pay cut upon returning to the wage sector which discourages
exit and to a personal commitment effect ascribed to psychological attachment and
escalation of commitment.
These findings are central for our understanding of the rewards available to poten-
tial entrepreneurs and thus for better modelling the decision to become entrepreneur.
In addition, there are implications for both policy makers and researchers, which we
discuss below.
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Implications for policy makers
We believe our results contribute to an understanding of the net effects of policies
aiming at channelling workers into entrepreneurship. First, the costs associated with
subsidising entrepreneurship should be evaluated in light of the expected time in
entrepreneurship relative to expected tenure in an established firm. Based on our
results, by targeting individuals with above average turnover tendencies these policies
could reap the benefit of employment stability and, in turn, alleviate the frictional costs
associated with high employment turnover. Second, our evidence of higher earnings
residual among entrepreneurs compared to movers in the wage sector suggests that
policies attracting movers to entrepreneurship may also increase their productivity
by securing them a high quality match. However, our results also point out that en-
trepreneurship lowers individuals’ labor market value, which in turn hinders exit from
entrepreneurship and introduces frictions at the point of re-entry in the wage sector.
This corroborates the need to adopt a selective approach rather than a one-size-fits-all
one. Policies should target individuals whose benefits associated with stability and job
matching are the highest. This will minimize the risk of failure or offset the cost of the
entrepreneurial discount in case of exit and return to the wage sector.
Implications for researchers
This research improves our understanding of the entrepreneurial entry decision.
First, finding greater employment stability among entrepreneurs contributes to a more
comprehensive understanding of the rewards available in entrepreneurship. This has
fundamental implications for whether we interpret the monetary returns as justified,
especially in light of the fact that leaving an entrepreneurial venture is costly (Gimeno
et al., 1997).
Second, the finding that movers are more productive in entrepreneurship, exhibiting
higher earning residuals, extends the debate on whether entrepreneurship does pay.
While the entrepreneurial earnings puzzle is well documented, emerging research has
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started questioning it (see e.g. Astebro and Chen, 2014; Tergiman, 2011). Drawing
on recent advances in labor economics to estimate match effects (Jackson, 2013), we
suggest that looking at earning residual differentials rather than at the observed earning
differentials may prove promising to re-estimate the monetary returns. This method
may be better at capturing the component of unobservable entrepreneurial talent. An
interesting research route could be to compare the two approaches to identify sources
of discrepancies and ultimately shed more light on the entrepreneurial earnings puzzle.
Finally, our analysis suggests that the documented high employment turnover
rates among wageworkers before moving to entrepreneurship (Astebro and Thompson,
2011) can be ascribed to an interaction between employment contexts and individual
preferences (job mismatch), and less to innate attributes of this selected group, i.e. a
taste for variety. Sorting out the job mismatch component from the taste for variety
effect would be another interesting topic for future research.
4
1 Introduction
Although scholars of entrepreneurship have extensively focused on whether entrepreneur-
ship pays (see e.g. Hamilton, 2000; Georgellis et al., 2007), little is known about the
effect of entrepreneurship on job stability. This gap is surprising because job stability
plays a central role in determining individual’s choices about where to work, firms’
hiring and retention policies, and in public policy concerned with the welfare effects
of turnover (see e.g. Jackson, 2013). Job stability is of particular interest in the en-
trepreneurial setting because an increasing number of policies are aimed at subsidising
entrepreneurship. It thus has become important to understand whether these policies
have a long-lasting effect and whether potential stability among entrepreneurs is a
desirable outcome in the labor market. Accordingly, this paper examines whether and
why the transition to entrepreneurship affects job stability.
Entrepreneurship is often portrayed as a risky, unstable career choice. Most pe-
riods of entrepreneurship are relatively short lived (see e.g. Taylor, 1999; Kaiser and
Malchow-Moller, 2011). Start-ups fail relatively quickly (Evans and Leighton, 1989),
and entrepreneurs have skewed and volatile earnings (Parker, 1997). For example, a re-
cent study by Kaiser and Malchow-Moller (2011) using Danish data found that among
new entrepreneurs, only 35.6% had persisted in entrepreneurship after five years.
Hence, entrepreneurship may be viewed as a transitory occupation that entrepreneurs
leave relatively quickly.
We challenge this view and suggest that entrepreneurship is in fact associated with
greater employment stability. We propose and test three theoretical mechanisms. The
first is a positive matching process between individuals that select entrepreneurship
and the inherent features of being an entrepreneur. The second is a lock-in effect
attributable to relatively poorer outside options in the labor market. Finally, the third
mechanism is another form of lock-in, attributable to personal commitment to the
business causing behavioral delays.
This study has important implications for ongoing conversations in entrepreneur-
ship. First, research on the returns to entrepreneurship typically documents that
5
entrepreneurship does not pay (e.g. Hamilton, 2000). Yet, a growing number of studies
appears to question this view by accounting for alternative explanations such as in-
come underreporting (Astebro and Chen, 2014), or the option value of experimenting
(Manso, 2016). Considering whether and why entrepreneurship may yield greater job
stability offers a new perspective to solve this conundrum by accounting for tenure
in entrepreneurship. Second, research indicates that entrepreneurs tend to change
jobs more often than the average worker before moving to entrepreneurship (Lazear,
2004). Understanding why this is the case is central for policies aiming at alleviating
labor market frictions. Indirect evidence suggests that job hopping is the result of
individuals’ innate attributes, i.e. hobos (Astebro and Thompson, 2011). However, if
turnover tendencies decrease after moving to entrepreneurship and result in better job
matches, the previous job hopping behavior can be attributed to an interaction between
employment context and individual preferences (i.e. a job mismatch).
Testing the relationship between entrepreneurship and employment turnover re-
quires a research design accounting for the endogenous choice to become an en-
trepreneur. For this purpose, we use longitudinally linked employer–employee data
mapping the employment histories of the entire Danish labor force to identify first-time
entrepreneurs in 2003. We then extract a comparable group of wageworkers who also
changed jobs in the same year. Among these, we identify a suitable control group by
implementing a comprehensive propensity score-matching procedure based on infor-
mation about the labor market, demographics, and the social relations of individuals
active in the labor force. This matched group of wageworkers serves as a counterfac-
tual sample and represents the unobservable employment turnover behavior of firm
founders had they not chosen to become entrepreneurs. Finally, we consider differences
in employment turnover rates between entrepreneurs and their matched counterparts
over a five-year period.
The empirical analysis revealed that entrepreneurship is associated with lower em-
ployment turnover rates, and provided evidence of the presence of the aforementioned
mechanisms (i.e. job matching and lock-in effects). Building on recent advances in
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the labor economics literature, which estimated the effects of job-matching (see e.g.
Jackson, 2013), we found that the entrepreneurs experience higher match quality than
their counterparts. In addition, by using a Mincer wage equation to estimate the labor
market value of individuals, we computed the wage premium derived from changing
to (a new) wagework setting and used it as a control variable in the duration analysis.
Entrepreneurship appears to decrease individual’s labor market value, which in turn
lowers the incidence rate of transitioning to a new affiliation. Moreover, the results
showed that entrepreneurs working with a spouse or whose firm exhibited negative
net capital tended to stay longer, which is consistent with the notion that personal
commitments are a source of lock-in effect. In addition, the supplementary analysis
showed that the results hold even when restricting the sample to necessity movers (e.g.
individuals who changed their jobs because they were laid off), further mitigating the
potential bias caused by the unobserved heterogeneity associated with entrepreneur-
ship as being a career choice. Finally, the results apply only to subsequent transitions to
wagework, not to subsequent transitions to entrepreneurship (serial entrepreneurship).
We interpreted this result as further corroborating the proposed mechanisms.
2 Theory
This paper postulates that entrepreneurship results in lower rates of subsequent job
transitions because of either desirable outcomes (higher utility) or undesirable out-
comes (lock-in). It is therefore important to account for these two potential antithetic
effects by distinguishing between job matching (a positive labor market outcome),
and lock-in related to labor market value and personal commitment (a negative labor
market outcome).
2.1 Job Matching
Job matching models in which turnover is a function of the (un)productive interaction
between the individual’s and the employer’s characteristics (Woodcock, 2014) are
7
used to explain employment turnover. Such models suggest that workers remain in
jobs where their productivity is shown to be relatively high (i.e. high-quality match),
whereas leave jobs where their productivity is shown to be low (i.e. low quality
match) (Jovanovic, 1979). High-quality matches are associated with earnings growth
over time (Topel and Ward, 1992), reduced searches for external opportunities, and
thus lower turnover rates (Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). Accordingly, a decrease in
employment turnover rates after the transition to entrepreneurship might be associated
with a positive match between the characteristics of the individual that self-select into
entrepreneurship and the inherent characteristics of being an entrepreneur.
Some workers may find that entrepreneurship is a high-quality job match, for three
reasons. First, there is a prevailing tendency for entrepreneurs to value independence
(Taylor, 1996). The preference for independence can trigger agency problems in wage-
work settings, which is why a significant number of entrepreneurs report disagreement
with a former employer as the primary motivation for the transition to entrepreneur-
ship (Klepper, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2010). In the context of entrepreneurship,
the agent (employee) and the principal (employer) collapse into a single entity, which
causes these agency-related problems to disappear (Lazear, 1981). This effect may
lower tendencies to individual employment turnover because entrepreneurship offers
a better match for those who prefer independence. Non-pecuniary benefits such as
autonomy also play an important role in determining the quality of the match and
therefore employment turnover (Jackson, 2013).
Second, entrepreneurs exhibit high turnover rates ex ante a transition to entrepreneur-
ship (Astebro and Thompson, 2011), which might be due to strategic sorting (Sorensen,
2007): individuals self-select a number of different jobs to develop a varied skill set
that will help them realize their ultimate goal of becoming an entrepreneur. Alterna-
tively, these individuals might move between jobs simply because they have a taste for
variety (Astebro and Thompson, 2011). Because such individuals gain experience in a
larger set of skills and job roles, they can be characterized as generalists rather than
specialists in terms of their skill sets. Generalists tend to be undervalued in wagework
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because the hiring process and reward systems are based on the specialized knowledge
of the employee, whereas entrepreneurship offers high returns for generalist skills
(Lazear, 2004). Hence, the wage offers received by individuals with a history of high
employment turnover may be lower in the labor market compared to entrepreneurship,
making the latter relatively more attractive in terms of matching skills.
Third, moving across firms entails redeploying human capital to a new setting.
The transferability of employees’ skills is likely to be higher if they become firm
founders than if they join established firms (Campbell et al., 2012). Working in different
firms provides the individual with different kinds of firm-specific human capital.
Lazear (2009) suggested that firm-specific human capital could be viewed as a specific
firm-dependent mix of various general skills. The cost of investing in the skills mix
corresponding to the weights assigned by a given employer may be higher than in
an entrepreneurial setting where the firm founder can design the preferred skills
mix. Therefore, new ventures tend to place a higher value on the different skill mixes
acquired by individuals who change jobs. It follows that the overlap between firm-
specific human capital and the skills required to establish a new venture is likely to be
higher (and therefore generate a high-quality match) in entrepreneurship compared to
alternative employment options.
2.2 Labor market value
There are reasons to conjecture that entrepreneurs will do well when returning to wage
work. As emphasized by Baptista et al. (2012), entrepreneurs obtain human capital
in the form of organizing, supervising and coordinating firm activities. This makes
them attractive in the labor market for management positions. The authors find that
entrepreneurs are attractive in management positions for smaller firms rather with
relatively lower wage levels and that they tend to be promoted faster than individuals
without entrepreneurial experience.
Entrepreneurship can, however, change a founder’s set of opportunities upon re-
turning to wagework (Hyytinen et al., 2013) through the depreciation of the human
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capital previously developed in the employment sector. Founders can lack experience
in the current labor market, as well as opportunities for training and advancement
in the firm or industry in which they previously worked (Bruce and Schuetze, 2004,
p. 576). In addition, potential employers may undervalue the abilities of former en-
trepreneurs. This is corroborated by Kaiser and Malchow-Moller (2011) who highlight
that the tasks undertaken by entrepreneurs differs substantially than those undertaken
in wage work. The human capital acquired in entrepreneurship may hence not be
easily transferable and applicable in wage settings. Kaiser and Malchow-Moller (2011)
emphasize that even if the human capital is transferable, a past entrepreneurial spell
may send different signals in terms of innate abilities which are undesirable in wage-
work settings. Entrepreneurs may thus receive a wage offer below their reservation
wage, thus contributing to the lock-in effect because of relatively poor and limited
employment options in the labor market. Moreover, the duration of the entrepreneurial
spell may contribute to the development of entrepreneurial human capital, which
might prove to be an irreversible investment with adverse effects on the move back to
employment in an established firm.
Empirical evidence suggests the existence of a lock-in effect based on the negative
returns to entrepreneurship in the wage sector (Bruce and Schuetze, 2004; Evans and
Leighton, 1989; Hyytinen and Rouvinen, 2008).1 Self-employment may reduce future
prospects of wagework, or it may reduce the wages of those who re-enter wagework.
Bruce and Schuetze (2004) found that for male workers, an additional year in self-
employment reduced future earnings in the wage sector by 3% to 11%, increased the
probability of unemployment by 3% to 10%, and increased the probability of part-
time employment by 10% to 30%. In addition, experimental evidence indicates that
compared to non-entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs receive significantly fewer job offers
when they attempt to reenter the wage sector (Koellinger et al., 2015). Entrepreneurs
returning to wagework could be penalized in the labor market because their skill
set may be less applicable or because of statistical discrimination if the recruiter
1Some question this finding and argue that the opposite applies (see e.g. Campbell, 2013; Fairlie,
2002; Hamilton, 2000; Kaiser and Malchow-Moller, 2011)
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assumes that an entrepreneur who seeks wagework has experienced the failure of
a firm (Koellinger et al., 2015). This unfair treatment in the labor market has been
associated with the “stigma of failure” (Landier, 2006).
2.3 Personal Commitment
Entrepreneurs facing poor firm performance may delay the decision to exit (Gimeno
et al., 1997; DeTienne et al., 2008). This delay is mainly attributed to behavioral
effects (Elfenbein and Knott, 2015). Recent experimental evidence suggests that equity
stakes in the firm are a sufficient condition to induce behavioral delay (Elfenbein et al.,
2015). We identify two sources of such delay. First, the entrepreneur’s psychological
attachment, which might have a predominant effect (McCarthy et al., 1993). This
psychological attachment may be reinforced by a sense of responsibility for the firm
and its stakeholders, especially if they have social links with the entrepreneur. These
ties, in turn, can create a psychological lock-in effect based on personal responsibility.
The most salient cases of emotional attachment to the new venture are family firms. It is
well documented that this emotional attachment delays exit by lowering the threshold
of firm performance that is considered acceptable (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The aim
is to prevent a loss in the socio-economic wealth that the entrepreneur receives from the
involvement in the family business (DeTienne and Chirico, 2013). The entrepreneur
may thus delay his or her exit due to an over-attachment to the startup.
Second, individuals may fall into the trap of biased decision-making due to an
escalation of commitment, thus persisting in a failing course of action. In the context of
entrepreneurship, substantial personal investment can cause the founder to delay exit
(DeTienne et al., 2008). The investment of energy, time, and effort in the firm causes
founders to develop a feeling of psychological ownership of the firm (Pierce et al., 2001).
The perception that the startup would lose value if the entrepreneur were to leave
may be a plausible effect of such a bias, especially considering that overconfidence and
over-optimism are typically observed among entrepreneurs (Busenitz and Barney, 1997;
Parker, 2013) together with founders’ tendency to feel indispensable. Accordingly,
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in the expectation that conditions will improve, entrepreneurs may wait to incur a
concrete financial loss before closing down their firm.
3 Data and Method
The Danish labor market database (IDA) and the Danish Entrepreneurship Database are
maintained and updated by Statistics Denmark. These databases are used to examine
the association between transitions to entrepreneurship and shifts in employment
turnover tendencies. The IDA is a matched employer–employee dataset tracking
individuals and their firm affiliations over time, including the entire active labor force
of legal residents in Denmark. The Danish labor market is comparable to the U.S. labor
market in several dimensions, such as employment protection, average employment
turnover, and entry and exit rates (Sorensen, 2007).
The Entrepreneurship Database covers all newly registered businesses and their
founders/owners. All firms are legally required to register with the Danish Business
Authorities. Founders register their firms using their personal social security number,
which instantly generates a unique firm registration number. These two registers are
combined by using identifiers at the individual and firm levels, which correspond to
the social security number of the individual and the registration number of the firm.
The data consist of yearly panels for 1999 to 2008, and provide information about
individuals, affiliations, and social and demographic characteristics.
These data are particularly suitable for investigating employment turnover tenden-
cies among entrepreneurs because they allow to address three important methodologi-
cal challenges. First, the database includes information about individuals who did not
transition to entrepreneurship, allowing the identification of a suitable counterfactual
sample. Second, it provides comprehensive information about the career histories of
individuals. Third, it tracks precisely the changes in individuals’ firm affiliations over
time. An individual’s occupation in a given year is determined by Statistics Denmark
according to the individual’s labor market status during the last week of November in
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that year.
Our sample frame consists of individuals who transitioned to entrepreneurship
in 2003. Based on this reference point, the analysis includes information about the
labor market dynamics from 1999 and five years after the transition, until 2008. An
individual is defined as an entrepreneur if s/he is recorded in the Danish Entrepreneur-
ship Database as the primary founder of a firm newly registered in 2003. In order to
isolate the treatment effect of entrepreneurship on individuals’ employment turnover
tendencies, while avoiding the presence of confounding effects as much as possible, we
focused strictly on first-time entrepreneurs who did not register a new firm from 1999
to 2002.
Additional restrictions were imposed on the sample of entrepreneurs to minimize
the likelihood that our findings could be attributable to confounding factors. First,
individuals affiliated with more than one firm in the form of either an entrepreneurial
venture and wagework or a second start-up in a given year were excluded because
hybrid transitions involve distinctive logics (Folta et al., 2010), which may be associated
with entrepreneurial stability. For example, wagework may provide a stable income that
sustains the start-up and thus contributes to lowering employment turnover beyond
entrepreneurship-related factors. Second, individuals aged under 18 years in 1999
and individuals aged over 60 years in 2003 were excluded to eliminate biases caused
by censoring. Third, individuals working in the agriculture, fishing, quarrying, and
construction industries were excluded because of the different labor market dynamics
in these industries compared to other industries, as well as to ensure comparability
with prior studies of entrepreneurship. Fourth, a wage restriction was imposed to
exclude individuals earning below a minimum amount (DKr10,000) in 2003. This level
was chosen to exclude part-time occupations, new and undeveloped start-up firms, and
individuals who underwent interval censoring in their affiliation with the labor market.
The same restrictions were imposed on the wageworkers.
Table 1 provides an overview of how the sample of entrepreneurs and potential
comparable wageworkers changed when we imposed the restrictions. Table 1 also
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presents some statistics related to how the average wage in 2002 changed when these
restrictions were imposed. The final sample of entrepreneurs included 1,255 first-time
entrepreneurs in 2003. Among the restriction criteria, the decision to examine only
non-hybrids had the largest impact on the number of observations used in the analysis.
In addition, in 2003, the average wage of entrepreneurs increased sharply when the
minimum wage was established.
Table 1: Sampling and restrictions
Restriction criteria
Full
Sample
Only
2003
movers
Non
hybrids
Age and
industry
Wage
mini-
mum
Entrepreneurs
Observations 8,802 8,689 1,988 1,934 1,255
Individuals 6,681 6,568 1,988 1,934 1,255
Mean 2002 wage 299,122 301,299 271,184 271,934 335,472
Non-entrepreneurs
Observations 2,105,029 799,568 164,098 137,892 134,529
Individuals 1,924,914 619,453 164,098 137,892 134,529
Mean 2002 wage 261,716*** 262,531*** 236,475*** 255,969*** 260,615***
Stars indicate statistical difference from entrepreneurs
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.1 Identification of a control group of wage workers
The investigation to determine whether entrepreneurship lowered individuals’ em-
ployment turnover tendencies entailed an important inferential challenge because
entrepreneurship is not randomly assigned. An increasing amount of empirical evi-
dence suggests that individuals self-select entrepreneurship based on certain attributes,
such as the preference for autonomy (Taylor, 1996), a taste for variety (Astebro and
Thompson, 2011), and individual abilities (Elfenbein et al., 2010; Lazear, 2005). The
claim that entrepreneurship lowers employment turnover might be a spurious result
of the selection effect if these observable and unobservable characteristics were also
associated with job change tendencies. This potential selection problem was addressed
by identifying a counterfactual sample of wageworkers. The individuals included in
the control sample represent the employment turnover among individuals who were
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equally likely to transition to entrepreneurship but who chose not to do so. Theoreti-
cally, this counterfactual sample represents the subject of interest (i.e., an entrepreneur)
had s/he chosen not to transition to entrepreneurship.
A counterfactual sample of 1,255 wageworkers was drawn from the 134,529 individ-
uals who were identified after imposing the same restrictions on moving wageworkers
as those imposed on the entrepreneur group (see Table 1). A propensity score match-
ing technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and more precisely a nearest-neighbor
approach was employed to identify this comparison group. This methodology has been
used to address the potential self-selection bias in previous studies of entrepreneurial
outcomes (Campbell, 2013; Kaiser and Malchow-Moller, 2011).2 The covariates as-
sociated with individuals who chose entrepreneurship were identified and used in
the matching procedure. An exact matching specification based on gender was used
because there could be systematic differences between females and males in their
propensity to leave current employment. In addition, a common onset of risk was
used by considering only wageworkers who also changed jobs in 2003. The underlying
assumption was that the individuals had no plan to move before starting to work in a
new context.
The variables used for the matching procedure were measured in 2002 because
matching is aimed at reflecting individuals’ characteristics just before the 2003 tran-
sition. The matching model includes variables that affected both selection in the
treatment group (i.e., entrepreneurship) and the dependent variable (i.e., ex post-
employment turnover).
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent variable
This study investigates the time to the first job transition after 2003. This contrasts
individuals who continued in the same firm in 2003 (transition = 0) with individuals
2The results are not sensitive to the chosen matching specification. Other techniques have produced
consistent results. The consistency of the results may be a by-product of the richness of the data from
which the matched sample was drawn.
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who left the firm they worked for in 2003 to work for a different firm (transition =
1). Wage equations also were considered in the analysis of the match effect and the
labor market value effect. Here the dependent variable was the yearly wage in Danish
currency (DKr) divided by 10,000.
3.2.2 Explanatory variables
The primary explanatory variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual
became an entrepreneur in 2003 (treatment group) and 0 if s/he moved to a new
wagework setting in 2003 (matched control group). This dummy variable represents
the entrepreneurs identified in the registration records and the control sample that
was extracted using the matching procedure. An entrepreneur is hence defined by
business ownership. Apart being well defined and unambiguously observable, this
definition also makes the present study consistent and comparable with prior related
contributions (see e.g. Kaiser and Malchow-Moller, 2011; Baptista et al., 2012).
3.2.3 Matching variables
Entrepreneurs are characterized as jacks-of-all-trades or as having a taste for variety
(Astebro and Thompson, 2011; Lazear, 2004). Such characteristics are highly collinear
with the tendency to change jobs. Therefore, it was fundamental to ensure that the
control and treatment samples were comparable in terms of these characteristics. To
this end, two variables indicating prior employment turnover tendencies were included:
the number of firms and the number of industries with which the focal individual had
been affiliated between 1999 and 2002. Using these measures as controls and matching
variables ensured that the samples were comparable in terms of employment turnover
prior to the onset of risk, thereby equating the groups according to variables that were
related directly to the dependent variable.
In addition, the control and treatment groups were matched according to several
demographic variables. First, parents may act as role models: individuals with en-
trepreneurial parent(s) may exhibit a higher likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs
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(Nanda and Sørensen, 2010). A dummy variable was used to measure whether at least
one of the individual’s parents was an entrepreneur between 1999 and 2002. Civil
status may also affect both entrepreneurship activity (Folta et al., 2010) and employ-
ment turnover. Thus, marital status was included as a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual was married or not. Having children may dictate a more stable
professional affiliation and may affect entrepreneurship. The two groups were matched
according to the presence of children younger than 18 years. A high level of education
may represent different opportunity costs and imply different labor market oppor-
tunities compared to lower levels of education. Thus, the two groups were matched
according to whether the individual had a bachelor’s degree or higher.
Four variables related to professional status and conditions were used in the match-
ing procedure. First, the number of years in the labor market may affect employment
turnover through switching costs. The wage earner’s experience was included as the
number of years the individual had been active in the labor force since 1979. We also
considered its squared term.3 Second, wage may affect the likelihood of changing
jobs because it accounts for a major influence on the decision to accept or reject a job.
Furthermore, evidence suggests a link between wage earnings and entrepreneurship
(Astebro and Chen, 2014). We used yearly wages in Danish currency in 2002 divided
by 10,000. Third, there are differences in entrepreneurship activity based on leaving a
large rather than a small firm (Elfenbein et al., 2010; Hvide, 2009). In addition, there
are good reasons to suspect that employees of larger firms might differ in employment
turnover tendencies compared to those in small firms. Thus, we included employer size,
which was measured by the number of employees in the firm to which the individual
was affiliated in 2002. Finally, the change in affiliation between 2002 and 2003 may
have been due to a necessity move. Necessity moves increase employment turnover and
often result in necessity entrepreneurship (Koellinger and Thurik, 2012). Necessity
movers were matched by including a dummy variable that reflected whether the firm
3We included age and age squared among the matching variables. However, the correlation between
age and work experience proved extremely high, and we decided to remove age from the list of variables
in order to avoid multicollinearity problems.
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to which each individual was affiliated in 2002 was still in existence in 2003.
3.2.4 Controls
The fixed effects of year and industry were included throughout the analysis. Industry
dummy variables represented the industry of the new employer in the case of wagework
and the industry of the new firm in the entrepreneurial case. These measures were
coded in 2003 and defined by two digit NACE codes.
3.3 Sample and moments
The validity of the matching procedure hinged on the assumption that systematic dif-
ferences affecting both outcome (employment turnover) and selection for the treatment
group(entrepreneurship) were eliminated. Table 2 reports the mean of the matching
variables and associated tests of differences across four samples: the treatment sample
of 1,255 entrepreneurs; the control sample of 1,255 matched wageworkers; the sam-
ple of movers from which the control sample was drawn; and the sample of workers
affiliated with the same firm in 2002 and 2003 (i.e., “stayers”).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics across occupational groups
Entrepreneurs
Matched
Wage
Workers Movers Stayers
Number of Firms 1.750 1.768 1.959*** 1.472***
Number of Industries 1.290 1.304 1.341*** 1.172***
Parent is Entrepreneur 0.056 0.059 0.037 ** 0.023***
Wage Earnings/10000 33.547 33.925 26.061*** 29.013***
Married 0.577 0.582 0.491*** 0.612***
Children 0.592 0.613 0.466*** 0.494***
Parent Firm Size/1000 2.121 2.167 6.537*** 5.677***
Necessity Entrepreneur 0.822 0.828 0.777*** 1.000***
Wage Experience 14.740 15.140 13.404*** 17.233***
Female 0.224 0.224 0.449*** 0.498***
Education 0.071 0.072 0.075 0.072***
Observations 1,255 1,255 134,529 908,964
Stars indicate statistical difference from entrepreneurs
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Based on these observable factors, there were no statistical differences between
entrepreneurs and matched wage workers. This result indicates that the propensity
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score-matching procedure was successful in producing two groups with no systematic
differences in these observable factors.4
The results shown in Table 2 generally confirmed our expectations related to en-
trepreneurs and their characteristics compared to wage earners. Two things warrant
some elaboration. First, on average, the entrepreneurs had less varied job histories
(number of firms and number of industries) compared to the moving wageworkers,
which would seem to contradict findings in the literature and theoretical assumptions
about jacks-of-all-trades’ and their taste for variety (Astebro and Thompson, 2011;
Lazear, 2004). This finding may be explained in part by the sample of entrepreneurs
investigated, which excludes hybrid entrepreneurs. It also reflects that the comparison
included movers but not the lower tail of the distribution of employment turnover. In-
deed, the group of stayers exhibited a significantly lower level of employment turnover.
Second, entrepreneurs’ pre-transition wages had a higher mean than the stayers’
wages did. This finding might seem counter-intuitive because stayers supposedly are
better matched than movers are, and better-matched individuals should exhibit higher
wages because of their higher productivity. Three factors contributed to this finding.
First, as Table 1 indicates, the entrepreneurs’ average wage increased sharply because
of the restrictions imposed; there was no comparable increase in the average wage
of wageworkers. Second, these statistics were affected by extreme earners among the
entrepreneurs, who were often sampled at both the top and the bottom of the earnings
distribution (Astebro et al., 2011; Elfenbein et al., 2010). A more detailed look at
the nature of the significant difference in earnings between entrepreneurs and wage
workers ex ante indicates that this reason affected the descriptive statistics. Third,
even if the lower tail of the income distribution were deleted, there might still be a
large share of part-time workers in the stayer category, which would have lowered the
average wage.
4We also ran a probit regression to explain the likelihood of selection for the treatment group rather
than the matched group, including the conditional variables used in the matching procedure. The overall
validity and explanatory power of the model was poor, as shown by the insignificant coefficients of all
the matching variables and the Wald χ2 test. The results of the P seudo−R2 were also low, suggesting the
relatively poor ability to explain the variation in whether the individual belonged to the control sample
or the treatment sample.
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Table 3 reports Pearson correlations between the variables in the sample of en-
trepreneurs and matched wage earners used in the main analysis.
Table 3: Correlation coefficients across considered variables (N=2510)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[1] Entrepreneur
[2] Number of firms -0.01
[3] Number of industries -0.01 0.49
[4] Parent is entrepreneur -0.01 0.01 -0.01
[5] Wage earnings/10000 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06
[6] Married 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.18
[7] Children -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.37
[8] Parent firm size/1000 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
[9] Necessity mover -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.02
[10] Wage experience -0.02 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 0.26 0.33
[11] Wage experience2 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 0.17 0.20
[12] Female 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.23 -0.02
[13] Education 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.22 0.03
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
[8] Parent firm size/100 0 -0.06
[9] Necessity mover 0.01 0.09
[10] Wage experience 0.02 -0.06 -0.09
[11] Wage experience2 -0.18 0.03 -0.09 0.79
[12] Female 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09
[13] Education 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.02
Absolute values greater than 0.02 are significant at a 5% level
4 Results
In total, 1,511 of the investigated sample of 2,510 individuals changed jobs between
2004 and 2008. Figure 1 reports Kaplan-Meier survival functions for the time to first
job transition after 2003, comparing entrepreneurs with the matched wageworkers.
It provides preliminary support for the proposition that entrepreneurs exhibit lower
turnover rates than comparable wageworkers do. A log-rank test confirmed that the
difference between the two groups was statistically significant. The entrepreneurs
showed a five-year median survival time, whereas the median for wageworkers was
three years. The mean values were 3.853 and 2.892 for the two groups, respectively.
The entrepreneurs’ incidence rate was 0.121, and the incidence rate of the matched
wageworkers was 0.255.
Theoretically, the fact that the entrepreneurs exhibited lower turnover rates than the
20
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
Note: Log-rank test statistic is 213.11 (p < 0.001)
comparable wageworkers did might have been caused by any of the three mechanisms
identified in the theory section of this paper. It is therefore important to give separate
accounts of all the three mechanisms: job matching, labor market value, and personal
commitment effects.
4.1 Job Matching effect
As an explanation for the observed empirical phenomenon, the job matching mecha-
nism suggests that entrepreneurs are better matched in their new affiliation than the
comparable wageworkers are. The quantification of match-specific productivity effects
is an important empirical challenge in labor economics (Lazear and Oyer, 2007, p. 20).
Jackson (2013) proposed an orthogonal match fixed-effect approach, as follows:
wijt = λwit−1 +θi +θj +
2008∑
τ=1999
piτIt=τ + εijt (1)
where wijt is the wage of individual i at firm j at time t. The lagged wage of
the individuals (wit−1), individual fixed effects (θi), firm fixed effects (θj), and year
dummies (It=τ ) are on the right-hand side. This approach implies the assumption that
individuals’ quality of match in their occupations is reflected in their wage (Woodcock,
2014). Accordingly, match can be measured as the average of the residual for an
individual in a specific firm.
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The match measure is computed using yearly wage data, individual identities, and
firm identities for 1999 through 2008. Two affiliations were identified for each of
the 1,255 individuals: the affiliation immediately prior to 2003 and the affiliation
immediately after 2003. Thus, the match effect was computed as the average of the
residuals within individual-firm observations. Figure 2 displays the kernel density
distributions of the average residuals ex post 2003, split between entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs.
Figure 2: Matching effect estimates across entrepreneurs and comparable wageworkers
ex post 2003.
Figure 2 depicts the tendency towards positive values for entrepreneurs vis-a-vis
wage workers. The average value of the match for entrepreneurs was 526,134 while the
corresponding value for wage workers was -6,447.331. The results of a t-test suggested
that they were significantly different (t = 4.001), indicating that entrepreneurs are
better matched compared to the matched wageworkers.
4.2 Labor market value effect
This paper argues that theoretically, entrepreneurs are penalized in the labor market
upon their return to wagework. Building on Hamilton (2000), we conducted a quantile
regression analysis to investigate the position of the subjects in the distribution of
wages earned in the first new job after 2003. Specifically, we considered the 10th,
50th and 90th quantiles. The entrepreneur dummy variable and control variables
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often used in wage equations were included as regressors. A negative estimate for the
entrepreneurship dummy indicates the penalization of entrepreneurs based on the
matched sample of entrepreneurs and wageworkers.
Columns 1 to 3 in table 4, report the results of the quantile regressions, which
consider 1,414 of the 1,511 transitions to wagework. The remaining transitions after
2003 were to entrepreneurship, and they are not considered to determine individuals’
value in the labor market. Entrepreneurs suffer a labor market penalty in the lower
earnings quantiles. The coefficients are negative and significant at the 10th and the 50th
quantiles. However, the significance did not appear in the 90th quantile, suggesting
that there was no penalization of high wage earners. At the median, entrepreneurs
earned approximately DKR94,000 less than comparable wage earners in their first job
after 2003.
Columns 4 to 6 in Table 4 refer to the results of a time duration analysis, explaining
transitions to the first new job after 2003. The model estimates discrete time transitions
because the data describe yearly observations; however, transitions could occur at any
point in time between these registered observations. A logit specification was applied to
predict the hazard of transitioning to a new professional affiliation.5 The total sample,
the low wage earners (bottom 10% in wage earnings), and the high wage earners (top
10% in wage earnings) are considered in turn in these columns.
The negative estimates associated with the entrepreneur dummy suggest that the
entrepreneurs suffer a lower hazard in changing their affiliation compared to the
matched counterfactual sample of wageworkers. The estimates vary based on the sub-
sample considered. Although both estimates were statistically significant, the estimate
of the low wage sample (-0.165) was lower than for the high wage sample (-0.041),
suggesting that the observed effect in the total sample could be partially attributed to a
value effect of the labor market. The hazard rate of wageworkers in changing affiliation
is 1.18 (1/exp(−0.165)) times higher than for the entrepreneurs at the lower end of the
income distribution, whereas the corresponding difference is 1.04 (1/exp(−0.041)) at
5We also considered a Cox proportional hazard specification; the results were unchanged, suggesting
that they were not a by-product of the chosen model.
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Table 4: Wage (1, 2 & 3) and Transition (4, 5 & 6) regressions – marginal effect reported
Quantile regressions against ex post wage Discrete time duration models
10th
quantile
(1)
50th
quantile
(2)
90th
quantile
(3)
Total
sample
(4)
Low wage
sample
(5)
High wage
sample
(6)
Entrepreneur -12.732*** -9.413*** -3.993 -0.076*** -0.165*** -0.041**
[1.353] [0.691] [2.695] [0.006] [0.056] [0.017]
Number of firms 0.009** 0.047** 0.013
[0.004] [0.024] [0.012]
Number of industries 0.014** -0.064* -0.013
[0.005] [0.037] [0.016]
Parent is entrepreneur -0.005 -0.012 0.038
[0.010] [0.048] [0.040]
Wage/10000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Married 0.005 -0.019 0.041**
[0.006] [0.029] [0.021]
Children -0.005 0.040 -0.012
[0.006] [0.029] [0.022]
Parent firm size/1000 0.001*** 0.004* 0.006**
[0.000] [0.002] [0.003]
Necessity mover 0.030*** -0.030 0.006
[0.005] [0.041] [0.019]
Wage experience 2.691*** 4.345*** 9.618*** -0.029*** -0.020 -0.004
[0.944] [0.787] [1.842] [0.005] [0.023] [0.018]
Wage experience2 -1.65*** -1.858*** -3.401** 0.006** -0.018 -0.012
[0.568] [0.433] [1.385] [0.003] [0.022] [0.011]
Female -6.696*** -10.424*** -16.578*** -0.010 -0.046 -0.019
[1.360] [0.791] [1.998] [0.007] [0.042] [0.034]
Education 5.844* 10.204*** 41.797** -0.010 -0.057 0.001
[3.437] [2.580] [20.074] [0.010] [0.074] [0.019]
Same industry 2.115* 2.179*** 3.499
[1.248] [0.810] [2.249]
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1414 1414 1414 8449 859 860
Individuals 1414 1414 1414 2510 251 251
R2/P seudo −R2 0.141 0.157 0.205 0.069 0.157 0.074
Log Likelihood -3691.290 -302.085 -364.284
χ2 508.890*** 110.860*** 52.750**
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
the upper tail of the income distribution.
However, individuals chosing to leave their 2003 affiliation in subsequent years
may not have been randomly selected. For instance, they may have selected to leave
that setting, or they may have been offered other options because of some unobservable
factors. In other words, we did not observe the wages of those who did not move, which
could have created an attrition bias in the estimates of the labor market values and
hence biases in the results shown in Table 4. To investigate this potential issue, we
applied a Heckman specification of the quantile regressions shown in Table 4, in which
the first stage models whether they left their 2003 job affiliation or not, and the second
stage explains the amount of the wage they received in their new affiliation. The results
are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. The results of the selection equation are
consistent with those shown in column (4) in Table 4, as expected. Column (2) in Table
5 shows that the entrepreneurs are penalized in the labor market, wage experience
is associated with an increasing value at a decreasing rate, and females earn less. In
addition, there are positive returns for education, and those moving into the same
industry earn more (industry-specific human capital). Moreover, the coefficient of the
inverse Mills ratio is positive, suggesting that the expected wage of those staying is
higher than for those leaving. This result is consistent with the findings in Hamilton
(2000).
In the next step, the Heckman estimates were used to calculate the expected wage in
an outside option for all individuals in each year. This estimated quantity, predicted labor
market value, represents the labor market value of each of the individuals according
to their observable factors. Subtracting the actual wage earnings from the predicted
labor market value provides the wage premium that the individuals would obtain by
transitioning to a new job. A negative premium indicates that the current wage is
higher than the market value wage, whereas a positive premium suggests that the wage
in the external job option is more attractive.6
6There was a decline in the number of observations because for a small number of individuals, wages
were missing for one or more years. This decrease in the number of observations appeared to be random
based on the difference between those observed and those not observed.
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Table 5: Heckman regression against wage after transition and regressions explaining
transition to a different job – Marginal Effects Reported
Heckman
selection
equation
(1)
Heckman
wage
equation
(2)
Discrete
time
duration
(3)
Entrepreneur -0.061** -12.541*** -0.041***
[0.026] [1.413] [0.007]
Wage premium 0.001***
[0.000]
Number of firms -0.009 0.013**
[0.016] [0.006]
Number of industries 0.006 0.018**
[0.023] [0.009]
Parent is entrepreneur 0.044 -0.007
[0.056] [0.017]
Wage/10000 -0.003*** 0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
Married -0.003 0.002
[0.023] [0.009]
Children -0.033 -0.008
[0.028] [0.009]
Parent firm size/1000 0.007** 0.003***
[0.003] [0.001]
Necessity mover 0.067** 0.054***
[0.029] [0.008]
Wage experience -0.010 5.160*** -0.049***
[0.028] [0.947] [0.008]
Wage experience2 0.002 -2.653*** 0.012**
[0.016] [0.609] [0.005]
Female 0.016 -11.310*** 0.007
[0.038] [1.325] [0.011]
Education 0.121** 16.293*** -0.043**
[0.059] [3.520] [0.017]
Same Industry -0.046 2.545**
[0.043] [1.187]
Inverse Mills ratio (ρ) 0.916***
[0.031]
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2080 2080 6489
Individuals 1414 1414 2134
Censored Observations 666 666
Log Likelihood -6738.187 -3330.583
χ2 361.550*** 303.960***
P seudo −R2 0.049
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
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The wage premium variable was added to the discrete time duration specification
model to account for the potential lock-in effect caused by individuals’ labor market
values. The results are presented in column 3 of Table 5. The estimated wage premium
is positive, suggesting that attractive outside options precipitate a transition. Because
the coefficient of entrepreneurs in the Heckman model is negative (-12.779), the en-
trepreneurs generally had a lower wage premium compared to the wageworkers in
the counterfactual sample. Therefore, the entrepreneurs tend to be locked-in because
of their labor market value. However, column 3 shows negative coefficients for the
entrepreneur dummy variable, suggesting that entrepreneurs exhibit greater tendencies
to stability even after controlling for the labor market value effect.
4.3 Personal commitment effect
A personal commitment effect, we argued, could delay exit as a result of escalation of
commitment and psychological attachment. Accordingly, we split the entrepreneur
dummy variable in two. First, to account for a psychological attachment as the source
of exit delay, we exploited variations in whether the new firm was a family business. In
this particular case, a split was created based on whether the entrepreneur’s spouse
was working for the new firm. When the founder’s spouse is employed in the start-up,
a behavioral delay is likely to occur because of emotional commitment. Second, to
account for the escalation of commitment, a split based on whether the net capital of
the firm was positive or negative was considered. A negative net capital is likely to
produce delay because the entrepreneur may wait to incur a concrete financial loss in
the hope that conditions will improve. This decision-making process is likely to be
biased by the entrepreneur’s over-optimism about future prospects and overconfidence
in the firm’s future ability to reduce the current debt/equity ratio.
Five percent (60) of entrepreneurs employed spouses in the company; and 131
(6%) of the 1,255 start-ups reported negative net capital in 2004 (i.e. one year after
founding). The same number of firms had negative net capital in 2008, but in this case,
it represented 17.5% of observations. The results of the discrete time duration analysis
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Table 6: Considering personal commitment lock-in effects on duration to transition to
new job – Marginal effects reported
Working
spouse
equation
(1)
Net
capital
equation
(2)
Entrepreneur
No working spouse -0.034***
[0.008]
Working Spouse -0.195***
[0.036]
Positive net capital -0.015***
[0.005]
Negative net capital -0.075***
[0.006]
Wage premium 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
Number of firms 0.014** 0.007**
[0.006] [0.003]
Number of industries 0.020** 0.009**
[0.009] [0.005]
Parent is entrepreneur -0.007 -0.004
[0.018] [0.008]
Wage/10000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Female 0.007 0.005
[0.011] [0.005]
Married 0.004 0.001
[0.010] [0.005]
Children -0.007 -0.004
[0.010] [0.005]
Education -0.049*** -0.023**
[0.018] [0.009]
Wage experience -0.052*** -0.025***
[0.009] [0.006]
Wage experience2 0.012** 0.006**
[0.005] [0.003]
Parent firm size/100 0 0.003*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.000]
Necessity mover 0.054*** 0.027***
[0.009] [0.006]
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes
Observations 6489 6489
Individuals 2134 2134
Log Likelihood -3314.733 -3314.386
χ2 315.100*** 376.030***
P seudo −R2 0.054 0.054
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
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considering the two splits are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.
Having the spouse working for the start-up induced entrepreneurs to keep the
startup operating for longer. This finding is consistent with the presence of psychologi-
cal attachment. The results of a Wald test indicate that the estimates for an employed
spouse and an unemployed spouse are significantly different (Wald χ2 = 22,97∗∗∗). The
estimate for negative net capital is significantly negative. Furthermore, it is signifi-
cantly lower than the comparable estimate for positive net capital (Wald χ2 = 26.94∗∗∗),
which indicates that financial investment induces entrepreneurs to delay exit and
explains why entrepreneurs stay longer in the entrepreneurial setting than comparable
wageworkers stay in the job setting.
The results for the control variables provide broad support for prior research on
the determinants of employment turnover. The results shown in Table 6 suggest that
individuals who have been employed in a greater number of jobs in the past are more
likely to move again, as indicated by the significant positive estimates associated with
the number of firms and the number of industries. Better-educated individuals exhibit
a lower hazard of changing jobs serially. Individuals with more years of wage earning
experience are less likely to change jobs, suggesting that longer experience is associated
with a higher likelihood of staying in a position characterized by a high-quality match.
The longer the individual has been active in the labor market, the more likely it is
that a high-quality match has been achieved (Topel and Ward, 1992). Finally, the
results suggest that individuals working for large companies and necessity movers are
more likely to make another move. This last observation might suggest that necessity
movers are more likely to obtain a low quality match in the immediately subsequent
professional affiliation because they were forced to find a new job, compared to movers
who moved for other reasons.
4.4 Robustness checks and additional analysis
Although the matching procedure was designed to eliminate as many observable dif-
ferences between entrepreneurs and employees as possible, individuals could have
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selected entrepreneurship because of unobservable factors, which could have caused
potential biases in the estimates, as they might not be fully captured by the observable
factors considered. To address this concern, we selected a sub-sample of necessity
movers (entrepreneurs and matched employees) that included individuals from com-
panies that exited the market in 2003 (i.e. layoffs). The endogeneity related to the job
decision is attenuated at least partially because these individuals were forced to change
jobs; hence, the change was less likely to be an active choice of the individual. The
results for this restricted sub-sample are presented in Table 7, where columns 1 and 2
show spouse and net capital, respectively. The results are consistent with the results
displayed in Table 6. This test also provides initial indication that the identified effect
of greater stability is caused to a lesser extent by entrepreneurship being attractive
among specific types of individuals. In other words, it offers strong support for the
results being a treatment effect of entrepreneurship on individuals’ turnover tenden-
cies, rather than being driven by individuals with poor outside options self-selecting in
entrepreneurship.
A further supplementary analysis was conducted using an alternative dependent
variable. Instead of the transition dummy variable, a categorical variable was used
to discriminate between subsequent transitions to wagework or to entrepreneurship.
The suggested theoretical mechanisms underlying the lower turnover rates pertain
primarily to subsequent transitions to wage work. Therefore, we did not expect the
results to hold in the case when entrepreneurs exited the firm to start another venture
(i.e. serial entrepreneurs). To verify this prediction, columns 3 to 6 in table 7 present
the results of a multinomial logit model of the likelihood of transitioning to a new
job in wagework (3 & 5) or to a new job in entrepreneurship (4 & 6), as opposed to
staying in the current employment (baseline). These results are consistent with the
prior findings in relation to the transition to wagework. However, they did not explain
variations that characterize further transitions to entrepreneurship after 2003.
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Table 7: Necessity movers and duration of transition to new job – Marginal effects reported
Necessity Movers Competing Risk Analysis
Transition to other job
Transition to
wage work
Transition to
entrepreneurship
Transition to
wage work
Transition to
entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entrepreneur
No working spouse -0.049* -0.048*** 0.014
[0.027] [0.013] [0.068]
Working Spouse -0.258*** -0.242*** 0.003
[0.077] [0.044] [0.018]
Positive net capital -0.039* -0.023*** 0.008
[0.022] [0.007] [0.038]
Negative net capital -0.109*** -0.095*** 0.002
[0.018] [0.006] [0.012]
Wage premium 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1245 1245 6505 6505 6505 6505
Log Likelihood -579.879 -583.810 -3617.597 -3617.597
χ2 78.630*** 75.100*** 381.430*** 381.430***
P seudo −R2 0.073 0.067 0.050 0.050
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
5 Conclusion
Public policy has increasingly turned to entrepreneurship to boost employment and
economic growth. To evaluate the net effect of entrepreneurship-related policies it is
important to account for how long individuals remain entrepreneurs. Surprisingly, we
know very little about the effect of entrepreneurship on job stability. Entrepreneurship
is often depicted as an unstable and risky career choice that is characterized by high
exit rates, short employment periods (Taylor, 1999), and high income volatility (Evans
and Leighton, 1989). The present study tests this view by investigating the effect of a
transition to entrepreneurship on individuals’ employment turnover rates.
This paper finds the opposite, namely that individuals who moved to entrepreneur-
ship exhibited lower employment turnover rates than comparable individuals who
moved to the wage sector. Further analyses show that this finding was caused by
the interaction between individual attributes and the characteristics specific to the
entrepreneurial setting. Entrepreneurs are found to be better matched compared to the
counterfactual sample of wageworkers, which was expressed by higher earnings residu-
als. Moreover, the findings show that entrepreneurs are penalized upon re-entering the
labor market. This expected penalty partially contributes to reduce turnover among
entrepreneurs. Finally, entrepreneurs who work with their spouse or who have nega-
tive net capital tend to stay longer, which is consistent with the notion that personal
commitment locks-in entrepreneurship.
Supplementary analysis confirms the robustness of the findings. By exploiting
exogenous variations in layoffs, the results are robust to the unobserved heterogeneity
related to the choice to become an entrepreneur. Moreover, the results only hold if the
subsequent transition was to wagework, not to entrepreneurship. In the case of serial
entrepreneurs, that is, founders who left their firm to start a new one, the findings pro-
vided further support for the proposed mechanisms. Serial entrepreneurship did not
entail the loss of match quality or re-entry into the labor market. Therefore, no penaliza-
tion was found, which may have allowed these individuals to circumvent the personal
commitment mechanism. For this reason, the transition pattern to entrepreneurship
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was equalized between the entrepreneurs and the comparable wageworker.
This study has implications for research on entry decision and returns to en-
trepreneurship. First, the finding that entrepreneurship yields greater job stability
for individuals who select in entrepreneurship adds to the rewards available to en-
trepreneurs and has important implications for whether we interpret the monetary
returns as justified. Accounting for the time dimension is particularly important since
switching out of an entrepreneurial venture is a costly process (Gimeno et al., 1997).
Second, the study brings a novel perspective to the well-known entrepreneurship
puzzle, i.e. why entrepreneurs earn less than comparable employees (Hamilton, 2000).
An emerging literature appears to challenge the existence of this puzzle (Astebro and
Chen, 2014). For example, Manso (2016) finds evidence of biases, such as experimen-
tation bias, when using cross-sectional comparisons of observed earnings between
entrepreneurs and counterfactual employees. Accounting for these biases makes en-
trepreneurial earnings more attractive. Along the same vein, we find that movers
are more productive in entrepreneurship compared to counterfactual employees, as
they exhibited higher earnings residuals, after controlling for individual and firm
level fixed effects. Comparing residual earnings with observed earnings differentials
may prove a fruitful research avenue to solve the entrepreneurship puzzle and more
cleanly isolate the entrepreneurial ability component. Third, the study contributes to a
growing literature on the consequences of an entrepreneurial experience. Our finding
that entrepreneurs are penalized upon re-entering the wage sector is in line with Kaiser
and Malchow-Moller (2011) documenting entrepreneurs exhibit lower hourly wage
returning to wage employment and switching industry increases the penalty. Similarly,
Baptista et al. (2012) showed that former business owners exhibit a lower return from
their experience compared to counterfactuals without entrepreneurial experience, but
progress faster up the job hierarchy in small firms. This apparent puzzle is reconciled
by looking at the long-term monetary returns rather than at the re-entry wage, i.e. the
wage right after closing or selling the start-up. Accordingly, Daly (2015) and Campbell
(2013) suggested a positive effect of long-term earnings from entrepreneurial experi-
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ence. In sum, the tendency for entrepreneurs to have lower re-entry wages could be
associated with some sort of negative signal or stigma (Koellinger et al., 2015). We
add to this literature by more intimately tying this finding to turnover tendencies of
entrepreneurs and demonstrating that the expected pay cut hinders entrepreneurs’
decision to exit. Fourth, the present study shows high turnover individuals are more
likely to self-select in entrepreneurship, consistent with previous research (Astebro
and Thompson, 2011). Yet, in contrast to previous research suggesting this job-hopping
behaviour is the result of innate traits (e.g. taste for variety), we offer evidence in favour
of a matching-based explanation. Since the turnover tendency changes when transi-
tioning to entrepreneurship, the underlying rationale can be ascribed to an interaction
between individual attributes with the specific features of the entrepreneurial work
context. Future research can build on this finding to better sort out the two mechanisms
of job mismatch and taste for variety in explaining the relation between job hopping
and transition to entrepreneurship. Finally, the paper forwards evidence suggesting
that lower turnover rates among entrepreneurs can be attributed to a job matching
effect, a labour market value effect, and a personal commitment effect. While we have
distinguished among these three rationales, more can be done in the future to evaluate
the relative importance of each of them in explaining the job stability outcome.
This article has implications for practitioners. It improves our understanding of the
rewards to entrepreneurship, which can be used to help individuals better evaluate the
choice of becoming entrepreneurs. Our results suggest that individuals who tend to
change jobs in the wage sector due to a systematic mismatch in terms of both preference
and skills may consider entrepreneurship as an attractive career option.
The results of this study have implications for policy makers who aim to understand
the net effects of policies that attract individuals to an entrepreneurial career. The
value of these measures should be viewed in relation to the time individuals spend as
entrepreneurs compared to their average tenure as employee. Our findings suggest
policy makers should target job hoppers to maximize the returns from stability and
at the same time to reduce the welfare costs associated with high turnover. The main
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reason is that these individuals are likely to find a better job match in entrepreneurial
settings, where better matches results in individual productivity gains. Yet, our empir-
ical inquiry also indicates entrepreneurship decreases the individual labour market
value upon re-entering the wage sector, consistent with previous literature (Baptista
et al., 2012). Hence, it is important to adopt a selective approach to minimize the risk
of exiting from entrepreneurship and at the same time to strengthen policies reducing
the stigma of failure.
Our findings have also implications for managers of established firms concerned
with employees’ turnover. Contextual settings were shown to be significant in pre-
dicting employment turnover rates. This result could offer new insights into the orga-
nizational features of established firms, which could consider establishing a context
that entrepreneurial individuals might find attractive. Mimicking the entrepreneurial
contexts in established firms may allow such firms to attract and retain employees with
an entrepreneurial disposition, thus reaping the benefits they bring. This potential
is in line with previous research on how organizational structure fosters or hinders
entrepreneurialism (see e.g. Ozcan and Reichstein, 2009).
Even by providing robust evidence of the proposed associations between the tran-
sition to entrepreneurship and a lower tendency to individual employment turnover,
this paper is not free from limitations. Most of these are highlighted and discussed
throughout the text. However, some limitations pertain to the use of propensity score
matching to generate a counterfactual group of non-entrepreneurs. Although this
approach is increasingly used to conduct counterfactual analysis in entrepreneurship
studies (Daly, 2015; Berglann et al., 2011; Campbell, 2013; Kaiser and Malchow-Moller,
2011), it has limitations. The primary concern is the potential violation of the assump-
tion of conditional independence, which requires that all variables correlated with the
probability of being in the treatment (control) group and the outcome variable are
observable and included in the propensity score estimation. The matching procedure
used in this study takes advantage of the richness of the data; the more comprehensive
the list of matching variables, the more likely it is that the assumption of conditional
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independence will hold. However, the inclusion of further attributes would not have
provided more than a marginal and non-significant improvement in the quality of the
current analysis, and it would have significantly reduced the size of the sample from
which the control sample was drawn. To mitigate concerns about the validity of the
matching procedure and to avoid overly restricting the size of the control sample, we
included a rich set of pre-transition variables that were correlated with both the proba-
bility of being in the entrepreneur group and turnover tendencies. We considered the
number and quality of these variables against the potential loss of including additional
ones with the aim of deriving the most suitable control sample. We also conducted
several checks to confirm the suitability of the control sample.
Propensity score matching can produce biases in the presence of unobservable
factors. Although we included several observables, it is possible that such factors might
have determined the assignment of an individual to the treatment group or the control
group. In this case, the stability effect would be overestimated if unobservable factors
were positively correlated with the likelihood of being an entrepreneur, and they would
be negatively associated with employment turnover. However, this potential bias is
likely to be limited in this investigation for three reasons. First, unobserved factors
are typically correlated with entrepreneurial outcomes, and they correspond neatly
to preferences and skills (Elfenbein et al., 2010). Both mechanisms are embedded in
the proposed mechanisms that we tested ex post. Second, we used matching variables
that capture the lagged value of the turnover tendency (i.e., the number of prior
firms and the number of prior industries), thereby partly capturing the unobservable
factors by applying an auto-correlation process in the propensity score matching.
Finally, we aimed at minimizing the possibility of selection based on unobservable
factors by replicating the analysis using a sub-sample of displaced workers whose job
change might not be based on their active choice. Layoffs produce fairly exogenous
variations in entrepreneurial activity by decreasing wages, increasing the likelihood of
unemployment, and lowering the reservation wage for entrepreneurship (Von Greiff,
2009). For these individuals, the choice of entrepreneurship may be determined partly
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by exogenous events, leaving less room for the potential effects of the unobservable
factors on the matching process. The results were unchanged when this sub-sample
was analyzed.
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